Short selling and intraday volatility: evidence from the Chinese market by Yongjie Zhang et al.
Short selling and intraday volatility: 
evidence from the Chinese market
Yongjie Zhang1,2, Keming Liu1, Dehua Shen1,2* and Wei Zhang1,2
Background
In spite of the fiercely blamed for decline in stock prices during the financial crisis, the 
China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) approved a pilot program for mar-
gin trading and securities lending on 31 March 2010. This program allows investors to 
buy or sell listed securities with borrowed money or securities from stock exchange’s 
member securities firms by pledging collaterals to the latter. Regulators in China expect 
that the policy would help improve the price discovery mechanism, increase liquidity 
of the securities market and provide a new trading option for investors. The margin 
trading and securities lending program can be recognized as the short selling regula-
tions in China. This event provides us a unique opportunity to investigate the impact 
of short selling mechanism on the market quality of Chinese stock market. Meanwhile, 
this approval conflicts with the US’s short selling regulations of July 2008, which barred 
naked short sales and required short sellers to borrow shares before trading. Given the 
special characteristic of the Chinese market, i.e., the market is dominated by individual 
investor, there exists price limits and the stock market is easily affected by the political 
events, empirically examining the impact of short selling mechanism on market quality 
remains of interest to financial economists and policy maker in China.
Literature review
It is generally accepted that short selling constraints bias upward or downward the secu-
rity prices (Miller 1977; Jarrow 1980; Figlewski 1981). Financial theories on the role of 
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short sellers and their consequences of trading are mixed. On the one hand, short sell-
ers are considered as informed traders (Boehmer et al. 2008; Diamond and Verrecchia 
1987), who move the mispriced securities closer to their fundaments by actively trading. 
On the other hand, trade-based manipulation schemes and predatory trading strategy of 
short sellers move the securities prices deviated from their fundaments (Allen and Gale 
1992; Brunnermeier and Pedersen 2005; Goldstein and Guembel 2008). Therefore, it is 
an empirical question to ask what the role of short sellers in China is. The primary moti-
vation of this paper, is the empirically findings of this rarely-concerned question.
Taken broadly, much of the empirical work on short selling can be traced back to 
Miller (1977) and Diamond and Verrecchia (1987). Miller (1977) argues that short selling 
constraints drive pessimistic traders out of the market, enabling the prices only reflect 
the valuations of the more optimistic traders; while Diamond and Verrecchia (1987) 
focus on the speed of price adjusted to efficiency due to lacking of informative traders. 
Most recently, a number of studies have analyzed the effect of the US 2008 short selling 
regulations. Boulton and Braga-Alves (2010) find that the restrictions negatively impact 
various measures of liquidity, including bid-ask spreads and trading volume. Boehmer 
et al. (2013) find that the small-cap stocks are broadly unaffected, but large-cap stocks 
suffer a severe decline in market quality, as measure by price impact, bid-ask spreads 
and stock price volatility. Kolasinski et al. (2013) show that the short selling restrictions 
do not reduce informed trading activities and may result in an increase by increasing the 
proportion of informed short sellers to uninformed ones. Some international evidences 
can also be found in Clifton and Snape (2008) and Gagnon and Witmer (2014). Spe-
cifically, for the Asia—Pacific market, Chang et al. (2007) find that short selling restric-
tions tend to cause the individual stock overvaulted. Hamson et al. (2008) find a decrease 
in market quality, i.e., market liquidity become decreased and the intraday volatility 
increased, when the ASIC’s short selling ban is introduced. Bohl et al. (2012) also find 
that short selling restrictions increase stock return volatility.
The objective of this paper is on investigating the impact of short selling mechanism 
on Chinese stock market. On a different methodology, but closely related to our paper, 
Chang et al. (2014) examined the impact of short selling on Chinese market. However, 
most of their focuses are on the price efficiency measurements and fail to identify the 
temporary intraday volatility, i.e., the impact of short selling mechanism on the period 
from 1 month before to 1 month after the implementation is deeply ignored. Hongwei 
and Xin (2012) examined the price efficiency of the underlying stocks based on the Dif-
ference-in-Differences model and concluded that the overall effect of marginal trading 
and securities lending mechanism was insignificant. However, the Difference-in-Differ-
ences model is not suitable (see “Relative ranking methodology” for details) in China 
and therefore their conclusions are problematic. Besides, Zhang et al. (2015) viewed the 
short selling mechanism as the natural experiment for the changes of information envi-
ronment and discussed impact of information environment on suitability of R2 and idi-
osyncratic volatility as proxies for firm-specific return variation.
In consequence, the rationale of this study is that using an appropriate methodology to 
extract the temporary impact of short selling mechanism on the market volatility. Our 
paper contributes to the literature in three main ways. Firstly, rather than focusing on 
the price efficiency, the intraday volatility is firstly examined and various calculations 
Page 3 of 9Zhang et al. SpringerPlus  (2015) 4:797 
of volatility are performed for robustness. Secondly, we propose the relative ranking 
method to difference out both the firm-level and macroeconomic-level confounding fac-
tors on condition that no proper control group could be identified. This method can be 
employed to examine the impact of other events in stock market. Thirdly, the empirical 
results would provide some managerial implications for the policy maker who is inter-
ested in improving trading mechanism and boosting the development of the Chinese 
stock market.
Methods
Short selling regulations in China
On 31 March 2010, with aim of enhancing the fundamental system of capital market and 
perfecting the securities trading modes, the short selling regulations, i.e., margin trading 
and securities lending, was launched. Totally, 90 constituent stocks in the SSE 50 Index 
and SZSE Component Index are initialed approved to sell short. Up to 3 May 2013, 
the designated securities list is revised 10 times. Specifically, seven exchange-traded 
funds were included on 5 December 2011. Summary statistics about these revisions are 
reported in Table 1.
This table reports the occurrence of events in which stocks on Chines stock market 
experienced the short selling regulations. We do not include the seven exchange-traded 
funds in this table. We obtain the historical versions of the designated securities list from 
the SSE and SZSE. Column 1 repots the date on which a revised list comes into effect. 
Column 2 reports the number of stocks that on the effective day. Column 3 reports the 
number of addition events that each time the list is revised. An addition event is defined 
as a stock is added to the list and therefore can be sold short. Vice versa, column 4 
reports the deletion events. Column 5 reports the stock exchanges of which the revised 
stocks belong to.
Data sources and sample selection
We obtain the information about the designated securities list from the Shenzhen 
and Shanghai stock exchanges. Capital data are obtained from the RESSET Finan-
cial Research Database, including daily stock returns, trading volume, volatility and 
Table 1 List changes, addition events and deletion events








2010/3/31 90 90 N/A 1; 0
2010/7/1 90 5 5 1; 0
2010/7/29 90 1 1 1
2011/12/5 278 189 1 1; 0
2013/1/31 500 276 54 1; 0
2013/3/6 499 N/A 1 1
2013/3/7 498 N/A 1 0
2013/3/29 496 N/A 2 1; 0
2013/5/2 495 N/A 1 1
2013/5/3 494 N/A 1 0
Cumulated 494 561 67 N/A
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capitalization. In order to make a comprehensive comparison, 2121 traded stocks are 
included in the sample as the basis for overall market performance, covering the calen-
dar date from 4 January 2010 to 29 March 2013 with 785 trading days. Besides, we define 
the effective addition event as the stock is traded span from 30 days before effective date 
to 30 days after that. The choice of 30 trading day’s window is determined by the event 
study methodology (Brown and Warner 1985; Boehmer et al. 2013), the empirical find-
ings of Chinese stock market (Zhang et  al. 2013) and the aims of this study focusing 
on the relative short period of the impact of short selling. We are left with 351 effec-
tive addition events without a single stock in ChiNext. Therefore, the ChiNext stocks are 
excluded in the evaluation of overall market performance. This sample selection proce-
dure allows us to examine the impact of short selling regulations on intraday volatility 
and returns meticulously.
Relative ranking methodology
Short selling regulations in Chinese stock market are unique in that only stocks on a list 
of securities announced by stock exchanges can be sold short. According to the Shenz-
hen and Shanghai stock exchanges, the target securities are prudently determined con-
sidering the market capitalization, price exchange ratio and daily turnover. Therefore, it 
is impossible to find out comparative stocks in light of market situation and their own 
condition. For example, the initial 90 stocks added to the designate list on 31 March 
2010 are the composite stocks of SSE 50 and SZSE 40, which are the largest stocks in 
both Shanghai Stock Exchange and Shenzhen Stock Exchange. Hence, any control group 
would bias the results to some extent. Moreover, as we all know that the individual stock 
performance is closely related to the overall performance of Chinese stock market. Mac-
roeconomic environment play a key role in affecting the volatility of stock market (Engle 
and Rangel 2008), i.e., the interest rate, inflation rate and GDP can either exacerbate or 
decrease the stock volatility. Since the short selling regulations for different stocks are 
released at different time in different exchanges. It is apparently inappropriate for us to 
focus on the absolute volatility before and after stocks are included in the list because 
of the changing macroeconomic environment. For these two reasons, a relative ranking 
methodology is proposed to “difference out” the confounding factors of other concur-
rent events and isolate the short selling regulations effect.
To empirically investigate the effect of the implementation short selling regulations, 
we define the relative ranking score (RRS) as the relative position of a certain stock com-
pared to the overall market performance. From this definition, we can compute the rela-
tive ranking score of volatility (RRSV), the relative ranking score of return (RRSR) and 
the relative ranking score of trading volume (RRSTV). Therefore, the lower of the RRSV 
is, the better of the implementation effect is.
(1)RRSV =
No. of Stocks with Higher Volatility than the Addition Event
No. of Traded Stocks in the Market
(2)RRSR =
No. of Stocks with Higher Returns than the Addition Event
No. of Traded Stocks in the Market
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Results and discussion
We calculate the relative ranking scores and the absolute value of returns, trading vol-
ume and volatility during the estimation window of [−30, +30] trading days. Figure 1 
plots the RRSR and its absolute value. Statistics data in Table  2 reports that both the 
RRSR (t  =  1.9112) and the absolute value of returns (t  =  1.7223) are insignificant. 
Figure 2 plots the RRSTV and its absolute value. Calculated from Table 2, we can infer 
that the trading activity is increase d by 14.89 % with statistically significant at the 1 % 
level (t = 7.0037) and the RRSTV is insignificant (t = −1.6735). Figure 3 plots the RRSV 
and its absolute value. Reported from Table 2, we find no discrepancies in the averages 
of absolute value between pre-event and post-event (t = −0.2241). However, the RRSV 
is significant increased by 6.463 % (t =  7.6690). Overall, these results show that short 
sellers in China destabilize the market, which is in accord with the Hong Kong evidence 
(Chang et  al. 2007) and inconsistent with the international evidence (Saffi and Sigur-
dsson 2011). This happens because the diverse information is aggregated in the market 
when short selling regulations are implemented. Previous unfavorable information is 
reflected and resulted in overvaluation of prices. Our finding also confirms the conjec-
ture by Allen and Gale (1991).
(3)RRSTV =
No. of Stocks with Higher Trading Volume than the Addition Event
No. of Traded Stocks in the Market
Fig. 1 RRSR and its absolute value
Table 2 Changes in RRS and its absolute value around effective addition events
*** Significance at the 1 % level
Pre-event Post-event t test
Panel A: RRS
 RRSR 0.5126 0.4994 1.9112
 RRSTV 0.2913 0.2979 −1.6735
 RRSV 0.5307 0.4964 7.6690***
Panel B: Absolute value
 Returns 0.0031 −0.00075 1.7223
 Trading volume 1.5598 × 107 1.3276 × 107 7.0037***
 Garch-volatility 0.0263 0.0263 −0.2241
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This table reports the changes around effective addition events. Column “Pre-event” 
shows the cross-sectional average of variables during the previous estimation window 
of [−30, −1] trading days relative to the effective addition events, and the “Post-event” 
shows the average in the post estimation window of [1, 30] trading days. Column “t test” 
shows the results of the paired t test to examine the statistical significance of the changes 
in average around the effective addition events.
To better understand the implementation effect, we classify the effective addition 
events into three categories based on event day capitalization (Boehmer et  al. 2013). 
Figure  4 shows that the small-cap stocks experience the sharpest increase in relative 
volatility (t =  14.4214). In the small-cap of effective addition events, the average rela-
tive ranking scores of volatility are 0.6918 and 0.5998 in the previous and post period. 
As calculated from Table  3, the relative volatility is increased by 13.30 %. In contract, 
the increase in relative volatility of middle-cap and maximum-cap stocks is less signifi-
cant. These results reveal that the overall effect of the implementation of short selling 
mechanism in China is obvious for the small-cap stocks. In addition to the aggregate 
information function of the short sellers mentioned previous, the discrepancies among 
different capitalization categories maybe explained by the composition of the short 
Fig. 2 RRSTV and its absolute value
Fig. 3 RRSV and its absolute value
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sellers (informed traders or predatory traders) and the trading activity (Huang and 
Masulis 2003).
This figure plots the RRSV around the effective addition events based on the event day 
capitalization. Each category consists of 117 effective addition events.
Our key finding is that short selling regulations facilitate the increase of intraday vola-
tility relative to the overall market performance even the absolute value is almost invari-
ant. Because it is impossible to find the ideal control group, we prudently confirm our 
results by employing two alternative calculations of volatility, i.e., the volatility of expo-
nential weighted moving average (ewma-Volatility) and the volatility of 60 days simple 
moving average (sma60-Volatility). Figures 5 and 6 plot these two measures of volatility 
Fig. 4 RRSV around the effective addition events based on capitalization
Table 3 Changes in RRS around effective addition events based on capitalization
** Significance at the 5 % level
*** Significance at the 1 % level
Pre-event Post-event t test
Sma-RRSV 0.6918 0.5998 14.4214***
Mid-RRSV 0.5303 0.5294 0.2332
Max-RRSV 0.3701 0.3599 2.3576**
Fig. 5 RRSV-ewma and its absolute value
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respectively. Table 4 report that there are no discrepancies in the averages of absolute 
value between pre-event and post-event but volatility relative to the overall market per-
form is statistical significant increased (t = 15.8478 and t = 18.1501). These results vali-
date the main findings in this paper.
Conclusions
In this paper, we examine the impact of short selling regulations on Chinese market. 
We identify the effective addition events as the stocks are included to the designated 
securities list. We find these events are associated with statistical significant post-event 
increase in volatility relative to the overall market and absolute value of trading volume. 
Furthermore, we classify the events into three categories based on capitalization and 
the results suggest that small-cap stocks experience the sharpest increase in volatility 
relative to the overall market performance. Various calculations of volatility are also per-
formed to test the robustness. These findings should be insightful to policy makers in 
China who have an interest in understanding the impact of short selling regulations on 
improving trading mechanism and boosting the develop of the market.
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Fig. 6 RRSV-sma60 and its absolute value
Table 4 Changes in  RRS and  its absolute value of  ewma-Volatility and  sma60-Volatility 
around effective addition events
*** Significance at the 1 % level
Pre-event Post-event t test
Panel A: RRS
 RRSV-ewma 0.5397 0.5033 15.8478***
 RRSV-sma60 0.5461 0.5190 18.1501***
Panel B: Absolute value
 ewma-volatility 0.0250 0.0251 −0.3186
 Sma60-volatility 0.0252 0.0252 0.1468
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